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Abstract: This contribution deals with legal protection against violations of the European
Convention on Human Rights at both the national as well as the international level. The con-
clusion is that the practice of the European Court of Human Rights is inadequate and that the
protection in the Netherlands could be better. Several recommendations are made in order to
improve the co-operation between Strasbourg and domestic institutions in the field of the
protection of human rights.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Eleventh Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
which became effective on 1 November 1998, aims primarily at implementing
(technical) changes in the Strasbourg supervisory system. It has been extensi-
vely commented on.' It may, nevertheless, be doubted whether citizens benefit
sufficiently from these changes should their legal protection be at stake due to a
violation of the Convention. In our opinion, however, gathering a new Court in a
new setting should be ample reason to improve this legal protection. Such im-
provements should be made both at the domestic level - as an example we will
focus on the Dutch legal order - and the international (Strasbourg) level. In the
sections 2 and 3 of this contribution, some recommendations are offered in this
regard. Obviously, the system will only operate adequately when both levels co-
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teristics of the new ECHR control mechanism as established by Protocol No. 11, signed on 11 May
1994, 15 Human Rights Law Journal 81-86 (1994). See also 21 NJCM-Bulletin 811-876 (1997)
containing several contributions on the Eleventh Protocol and the text of the new ECHR. After the
Eleventh Protocol took effect, the numbering of the Convention articles partly changed.
12 Leiden Journal of International Law 833-845 (1999)
© 1999 Kluwer Law International
834 Legal Protection Against Violations ofthe ECHR 12 LJIL (1999)
operate; section 4 deals with this co-operation. Finally, some conclusions will be
drawn in section 5 of this article.'
2. STRASBOURG: INADEQUATE
2.1. The state of affairs
As regards effective legal protection afforded to applicants, the Strasbourg pro-
cedure is open to rather severe criticism - even with the incorporation of the
Eleventh Protocol. It seems the supervisory institutions (continue to) grapple
with reconciling both functions of the Strasbourg procedure. On the one hand, it
is the Court's task to safeguard the implementation of treaty obligations in gene-
ral, that is, separate from individual cases, using such cases only as an induce-
ment to action (recours objectify? On the other hand, it is to offer legal protec-
tion to the individual involved in the procedure (recours subjectif).
Effective protection of human rights first of all requires the availability to an
individual of an accessible, fast and professional procedure.' The Strasbourg su-
pervisory procedure does not comply completely with these criteria. It is rela-
tively inaccessible, rather slow and burdensome. Furthermore, specific expertise
on domestic law is often limited in Strasbourg, because attention has to be dis-
tributed among many domestic systems. In contrast, domestic institutions are in
direct and continuous contact with important social forces within the member
states. The European Court of Human Rights (Court or ECrtHR) also acknow-
ledges that to pass judgment in a given case, domestic institutions are often in a
superior position as compared to the Court.' Furthermore, the Strasbourg insti-
tutions are far removed from the applicants. Added to this is the fact not every-
one can afford the time and money to go to Strasbourg.
A second requirement of crucial importance to any procedure for the effec-
tive protection of human rights is that actual redress be guaranteed in case a fun-
damental right has been violated. The Strasbourg procedure cannot sufficiently
2. This article is basedon our doctoral theses. They deal respectively with the right to effective domes-
tic legal protection againsthuman rights violations (Art. 13 ECHR) and with compensation for such
violations (Art. 41 - the former Art. 50 - ECHR). See T. Barkhuysen, Artikel 13 EVRM: effectieve
nationale rechtsbescherming bij schending van mensenrechten [Article 13 ECHR: Effective National
Legal Protection in Case of Human Rights Violations] (1998) and M.L. van Emmerik, Schadever-
goedingbij schending van mensenrechten, De rechtspraktijk onder het EVRM vergeleken met die in
Nederland[Compensation for Human Rights Violations. Comparing the Legal Practice of the ECHR
with Dutch LegalPractice] (1997).
3. See Art.19ECHR.
4. See, e.g., AJ.P. Tammes, The Obligation to Provide Local Remedies, in M. Nolte et al. (Eds.),
Volkenrechtelijke opstellen aangeboden aanOJ.H. van der Molen 152-168 (1962).
5. E.g., Handyside v. The United Kingdom, ECrtHR 7 December 1976 (Ser. A), Vol. 24, para. 48. See
A.W. Heringa, Constitutionele partners [Constitutional Partners] (1996).
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meet this requirement. This is because judgments of the Court do not automati-
cally nullify actions of contracting states that constitute violations of the Con-
vention. In case a state does not honour a positive obligation deriving from the
Convention, a Strasbourg judgment does not automatically provide an applicant
with a claim to the state's (belated) action. The judgment has a declaratory char-
acter only: it merely contains a binding statement of a violation," States are
obliged to provide redress, but it is left to their discretion how to honour this ob-
ligation," The Court lacks the authority to declare legislation or measures con-
flicting with the Convention void, nor can it review irrevocable verdicts of do-
mestic courts. The Court is also not authorised to order the relevant contracting
state to act. The Committee of Ministers however supervises the enforcement of
Strasbourg judgments." Still, a complaint frequently heard is that a Strasbourg
'victory' brings the applicant little or no gain. In many contracting states, in-
cluding the Netherlands, applicants have few or no options to claim redress
based on a judgment of the Court," So far, case-law has not established whether
an individual can complain in Strasbourg of a violation of Article 46 paragraph
1 ECHR (the obligation of a state to conform to judgments of the Court) when a
contracting state does not implement a judgment. 10 Nonetheless, based on Arti-
cle 41 ECHR the Court has the authority to award the victim "just satisfac-
tion."11 Indeed, research into the practice of the Court concerning Article 41
ECHR shows, on the one hand, that it liberally interprets this authority and con-
siders itself competent to award equitable satisfaction as soon as the liable state
refuses compensation claimed by an applicant. By doing so, it is not duly im-
pressed by the condition contained in the article, that compensation can only be
awarded when the domestic law of a contracting state only provides for partial
6. See Arts. 44-46 ECRR.
7. Marckx. v. Belgium, ECrtRR13 June 1979 (Ser. A), Vol. 31, para. 58.
8. Art. 46 (2) ECHR.
9. See T. Barkhuysen & M.L. van Emmerik, Betere tenuitvoerlegging van Straatsburgse uitspraken in
de Nederlandse rechtsorde: zaak heropenen ofschadeclaim tegen de staat [Better Execution of the
Strasbourg Decisions in the Dutch Legal Order: Re-open a Case, or Bring a Claim for Damages
Against the State], 21 NJCM-Bulletin 987-1051(1996).
10. Olsson (no. 2) v. Sweden., ECrtHR 27 November 1992, (Ser. A), Vol. 250. See S.K. Martens, Indi-
vidual Complaints Under Article 53 ofthe European Convention on Human Rights, in R. Lawson &
M. de Blois (Eds.), The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe, Essays in Honour of
Henry G. Schermers 253-292 (1994).
11. With the Eleventh Protocol the wording of Art. 50 - without aiming at material change - has become
more concise and is to be found in Art. 41: "If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the
Convention or the protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned
allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the
injured party." See on Art. 41, e.g., Montserrat Enrich Mas, Right to Compensation Under Article 50,
in R.StJ. Macdonald et al. (Eds.), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights 775-790
(1993); H.C. Kruger, Reflections on Some Aspects ofJust Satisfaction Under the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, in V. Berger et al. (Eds.), Liber amicorum M.-A. Eissen, 255-269 (1995); and
J.L. Sharpe, Article 50, in L.E. Petitti et al. (Eds.), La Convention Europeenne des Droits de
I'Homme, Commentaire article par article, 809-842 (1995).
836 Legal Protection Against Violations ofthe ECHR 12 LJIL (1999)
redress of the consequences of a treaty violation. On the other hand, the Court
often awards no compensation at all. It contents itself regularly, without any
motivation, with pronouncing that the mere finding of a violation of the Con-
vention constitutes sufficient satisfaction for non-material damage incurred.
Furthermore, claims concerning material damage are dismissed on the ground
the Court cannot speculate on the outcome of the domestic procedure should the
requirements of the Convention have been fulfilled." In other words, the Court
has difficulties in establishing a causal link between a treaty violation and dam-
age. Added to the fact that Article 41 ECHR provides the Court with inadequate
authority, the present practice on compensation - insufficiently safeguarded and
inconsistent - emphasises the need for domestic means of redress after a Stras-
bourg condemnation.
Considering all this, it is possible to conclude that the Strasbourg procedure
insufficiently guarantees actual redress after the violation of a fundamental right.
Also, the long duration of a Strasbourg procedure detracts from this 'healing'
power. It is not to be expected that these procedural shortcomings will be cor-
rected in the near future, not even with the Eleventh Protocol in force. This
Protocol does not provide for substantial adjustments of treaty provisions con-
cerning the consequences of established treaty violations. Statistics published by
the Registrar of the Court, show that the Protocol so far has not lead to a faster
settlement of complaints. On the contrary, the workload of the Court has contin-
ued to rise sharply." If any improvements in this respect would be possible, they
would probably be offset by the expected increase in the number of complaints
after the accession of a lot of new Contracting States. After the recent Georgian
ratification of the ECHR there are 41 Contracting States and about 700 million
potential applicants. The Eleventh Protocol has abolished the Commission,
which up until its abolishment acted as a sort of 'filter'. As a consequence, some
authors fear the Court will be inundated, causing complaints about relatively
minor violations to suffer. Increasingly, the Court will have to prioritise.
2.2. Suggestions for improvement
The Court should attempt to cope with the shortcomings in the Strasbourg legal
protection described above. We are aware, however, of the challenges posed by
the present powers of the Court and the available (financial) means. Consequent-
ly, in our opinion, an extension of these powers and a higher budget should be
given to the Court where necessary. More financial means might contribute to
the speed and accessibility of the Strasbourg procedure, especially by increasing
12. Comparable conclusions concerning the practice of the Court on Art. 41 ECHR are drawn by A.R.
Mowbray, The European Court ofHuman Rights I Approach to Just Satisfaction, 4 (Winter), Public
Law 647-658 (1997).
13. See Press Release, 21 June 1999, no. 349.
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staff volume. In this way also, more specific expertise on the differing domestic
legal systems could be incorporated. Within the existing setting at least, the fol-
lowing improvements in the Strasbourg legal protection might be realised.
First, the Court should streamline its decisions on compensation, based on
Article 41 ECHR. The Court should thoroughly motivate these judgments, espe-
cially when it rejects a claim to compensation, or confines itself to declaring the
finding of a treaty violation as sufficient just satisfaction for the purposes of Ar-
ticle 41 ECHR. If the Court would establish a certain standard of compensation
for non-material harm, indexed to the standard of living in the relevant Con-
tracting State, this would contribute to equality before the law and to legal secu-
rity. For instance, the Court could determine set amounts of money for every
day of detention in violation of Article 5 ECHR, or for the violation of the rea-
sonable time requirement laid down in Article 6 ECHR. While on the one hand,
it should be admitted that such standardisation is arbitrary, on the other hand, it
may help prevent arbitrariness. Furthermore, the Court should be able to take
into account the special circumstances in a particular case and to deviate from
the standards set. This might result in awarding a higher amount, for instance, in
the case of depriving a psychiatric patient of his liberty and administering forced
medication in violation of Article 5 ECHR, or a lower amount in the case of a
minor procedural omission. In case the harm is very slight, the Court could pos-
sibly confine itself to considering the finding of a violation sufficient satisfacti-
on, albeit on the condition that this decision is thoroughly motivated.
Second, the Court could, where appropriate, make suggestions as to the repa-
rations to be made by the State found liable. For instance, in the case of an ex-
propriation in violation of Article 1 of the First Protocol, the Court might recom-
mend the property to be returned to remedy the violation. This way, restitutio in
integrum may be approximated and future violations be prevented. The practice
under the American Convention on Human Rights may serve as an example
(Article 63 ACHR).14
Last, the Strasbourg legal protection might gain in impact by requesting
states more frequently to arrange for interim measures of protection for the du-
ration of the Strasbourg procedure (the present 'Rule 39' procedure) - and not
only in cases about aliens. In our opinion, further - comparative - research is
needed in this area, especially concerning the option to make these requests
binding.
14. See, e.g., B. Fontana, Damage Awards/or Human Rights Violations in the European and InterAmeri-
can Courts ofHuman Rights, 31 SantaClaraLaw Review 1127-1169 (1991).
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3.1. The state of affairs
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Article 13 ECHR lists the requirements domestic legal protection should meet in
cases of violations of human rights. States are obliged to provide for domestic
legal remedies in case of a breach of the Convention. IS This article awards indi-
viduals a right to an effective domestic legal remedy against (alleged) violations
of human rights as contained in the Convention. Article 13 in this way obliges
states to provide for effective domestic legal protection and offers the Stras-
bourg and domestic institutions the means to supervise the implementation of
this obligation. For Article 13 ECHR to be applicable it is not required - unlike
the wording of the article suggests - that a violation has been found of the mate-
rial right invoked simultaneously. The Court determined this in 1978.16 More re-
cently, case-law specified that an 'arguable claim' to a violation of a right is
necessary for the applicability ofArticle 13 ECHR. 17
Since 1978, the case-law of Court and Commission on Article 13 shows a
substantial increase in the number of requirements domestic legal protection is
to meet. 18 Roughly speaking, these amount to the following. A procedure should
be available before a national authority so as to investigate a complaint of a
breach of Convention rights. In this procedure either the Convention rights
themselves, or materially comparable national standards should be applicable. If
the complaint is found to be valid, the national authority should have the power
to reach a binding decision on full redress (restitutio in integrum). Should this
no longer be an option, it should be possible to award compensation. This na-
tional authority does not necessarily need to be a judicial institution. In order to
meet the requirements of effectivity of Article 13, it should be more or less
comparable to a judicial institution where its authority and procedural guaran-
tees (e.g. independence and impartiality) are concerned. Subsequently, this arti-
cle obliges the relevant national authorities in cases of (alleged) violations of
15. Art. 13 ECHR: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity." On Art. 13 ECHR see also A. Drzemczewski &
C. Giakoumopoulos, Article 13, in L.E. Pettiti et ai. (Eds.), supra note 11, at 455-474; G.H. Thune,
The Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Law: Article 13 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, in D. Gomien (Ed.), Broadening the Frontiers of Human Rights (Essays in Honour of
Asbjern Eide) 79-95 (1993).
16. Klass et at. v. Germany, ECrtHR 6 September 1978, (Ser. A), Vol. 28, para. 62 et seq.
17. Silver et al. v. The United Kingdom, ECrtHR 25 March 1983, (Ser. A), Vol. 61, para. 113.
18. See, e.g., Swedish Engine Drivers' Union v. Sweden, ECrtHR 6 February 1976, (Ser. A), Vol. 20;
Klass et al. v. Germany, ECrtHR 6 September 1978, (Ser. A), Vol. 28; Silver et at. v. The United
Kingdom, ECrtHR 25 March 1983, (Ser. A), Vol. 61; Leander v. Sweden, ECrtHR 26 March 1987,
(Ser. A), Vol. 116; Soering v. The United Kingdom, ECrtHR 7 July 1989, (Ser. A), Vol. 161.
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human rights actually to exercise the required powers mentioned above, and in
doing so to provide actual legal protection in a specific case.
However, in our opinion the final verdict on the Strasbourg case-law on Arti-
cle 13 is not a positive one. The requirements of the legal protection offered
could be extended. Also, the scope of Article 13 should be widened to encom-
pass primary legislation (Acts of Parliament). Furthermore, limitations on the
right to effective legal protection, for instance, when national security is at issue,
should be less acceptable. Finally, the Strasbourg institutions should, more con-
sistently than up till now, supervise the implementation of the obligations under
Article 13. They should definitely not avoid the application of this article by
pointing to the investigation of other Convention rights invoked.
Dutch legal protection meets the requirements described above reasonably
well. One important reason for this is the availability in the Netherlands of a
procedure before a judicial institution for, in principle, all cases of (alleged)
violations of human rights. When there is or has been no special judicial proce-
dure available, the civil courts can in principle hear a case on tort. In the Nether-
lands the civil courts thus, so to speak, close the 'loopholes' in the legal protec-
tion. Furthermore, Dutch judges usually have adequate authority to deal with a
complaint about a violation of a human right. Of special importance is the incor-
poration of the Convention in the Dutch legal order, the precedence of its stipu-
lations over conflicting national norms (including Acts of Parliament), and the
option for Dutch citizens directly to invoke most stipulations of the Convention
in a judicial procedure (Articles 93 and 94 of the Constitution)." Another con-
tribution to the effectivity of the Dutch protection of human rights, is the fre-
quent willingness of Dutch judges to take into account the judgments of the
Strasbourg Court, even where the addressees were other States. Lastly, Dutch
judicial institutions and counsel, generally speaking, have a reasonable level of
expertise on the Convention and the most important Strasbourg case-law. These
days, the Convention and Strasbourg case-law form part of the education of
judges and counsel.
3.2. Suggestions for improvement
All the same, there is room for improvement of the Dutch legal protection
against violations of human rights. There are cases in which a Dutch judge will
find a breach of the Convention, but subsequently do no more than pronounce
himself incompetent on the question of reparation, asserting that this question
19. See P. van Dijk, De houding van de Hoge Raad jegens verdragen inzake de rechten van de mens
[The Attitudeof the Supreme Courttowards HumanRights Treaties], in B. Baardman et al. (Ed.), De
plaats van de HogeRaad in het huidige staatsbestel (1988).
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falls within the competence of the legislature." Because of this 'abstinence', the
Article 13 obligation to provide an effective remedy in a specific case after a
Convention violation has been established, is not met. In this way, the applicant,
who has been found to be in the right, is sent home empty-handed and remains,
unjustly, 'the third dog in the game of skittles'. Furthermore, the legal protection
offered by the civil courts is sometimes less than perfect, because for the time
being the Supreme Court assumes only an extremely limited liability on the
grounds of wrongful administration of justice." In our opinion, this liability
should be extended, because the judiciary too might violate the Convention by
its actions (judgments), for example, in connection with the requirements of Ar-
ticle 6 ECHR. In cases like these, there should also be an effective remedy.
Furthermore, more liberal compensation for non-material harm, caused by vio-
lations of human rights, should be awarded (on the basis of Article 6:106 juncto
6:162 Civil Code). Dutch case-law in this respect needs to catch up with that of
Strasbourg, especially in cases of violations of procedural rights, like the ex-
ceeding of the reasonable time-limits.
4. STRASBOURG - THE NETHERLANDS: IMPROVED CO-OPERATION
The preceding paragraphs dealt with the legal protection offered by the Stras-
bourg and the domestic (Dutch) institutions. Suggestions have been made for the
improvement of the legal protection at both levels separately. As stated in the
introduction, the system of protection of hUlnan rights under the Convention can
only operate effectively on the basis of smooth co-operation between the Stras-
bourg and domestic (Dutch) institutions. The following offers some remarks on
this co-operation.
4.1. Emphasis on domestic legal protection
Applicants should not have to appeal to Strasbourg. Naturally, in order to
achieve this, the prevention of violations should be put first (for instance, by ex-
amining domestic legislation against the Convention before it is put into effect).
If a violation does occur, this should in our opinion be 'repaired' by a domestic
institution. In other words, the emphasis in legal protection should be on the
domestic level. This would still be valid even if the Strasbourg procedure for re-
dress were to be improved.
The preceding paragraphs have shown that to provide effective legal protec-
tion at higher speed and of a better quality, domestic institutions are, in princi-
20. See/or instance Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) 5 September 1997, 22 NJCM-Bulletin 149-155 (1998),
with note by C. Forder (adoption by two lesbian mothers).
21. Hoge Raad 3 December 1971, NJ 1972, 137 with note by GJ. Scholten.
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ple, better equipped than international ones. For applicants, a domestic proce-
dure is usually preferable.
Furthermore, the availability of effective domestic remedies is of importance
for the (continued) operation of the Strasbourg supervisory system.
To begin with, domestic remedies have an important 'filter function'. Many
complaints can be dealt with at a national level, Strasbourg thus not being un-
duly burdened. The Strasbourg system is not geared to dealing with complaints
as a court of first instance. Also, from the point of view of state sovereignty, it
would be unreasonable to require a state to justify itself directly in Strasbourg
before its own institutions would have had an opportunity to judge the complaint
- an argument which constitutes the basis for Article 35, paragraph 1 ECHR,
entailing the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies before complaining in
Strasbourg. This filter function of the domestic remedies only increases in im-
portance with the increase in the number of Contracting States to the ECHR. In
spite of the efforts of the new - mostly Eastern European - Contracting States to
model their legislation after the requirements of the ECHR, an increase in the
number of complaints is to be expected. As a consequence, the Strasbourg sys-
tem will be in danger of collapse. If states would comply completely with the -
preferably more broadly interpreted - obligation of Article 13 in combination
with the obligation for individuals ex Article 35, paragraph 1 ECHR to utilise
the available effective domestic remedies, it would be feasible to realise a (fur-
ther) 'decentralisation' of the legal protection from the international to the na-
tionallevel.
Furthermore, for those complaints which would reach Strasbourg, the task of
the Strasbourg institutions in judging them would be alleviated by the fact that a
domestic institution would have established the facts and have dealt with the ar-
guments of both the applicant and the state. In the context of a given case,
something of a dialogue could take place between the domestic institution ex-
amining the complaint and Strasbourg. The preparatory efforts of domestic in-
stitutions only increase in importance now the Eleventh Protocol has abolished
the Commission. The Commission had an important role in preparing cases for
the Court.
Even though this is not stated explicitly in the Convention, it is clear the
Strasbourg supervisory mechanism is based on the principle of subsidiarity."
The Strasbourg supervision is only intended to supplement the domestic reme-
dies." This subsidiarity concerns primarily the procedural relation between na-
tional and international supervising institutions (the rule of exhaustion). None-
22. This can implicitly be derived from Arts. 1, 13,35,41,52 and 53 ECHR.
23. See Belgian Linguistic cases, ECrtHR 23 July 1968, (Ser. A), Vol. 6, para. 10; Handyside v. The
United Kingdom, ECrtHR 7 December 1976, (Ser. A), Vol. 24, para. 48. More recently, with the lit-
eral use of the concept 'subsidiarity', United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, ECrtHR 30
January 1998, RJD 1998, para. 28.
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theless, it has material implications also. These are first and foremost concerned
with the limits Strasbourg institutions are to heed when exercising their supervi-
sion. When reviewing the actions or failures to act by governmental institutions,
Strasbourg allows national authorities a certain 'margin of appreciation' .24 Fur-
thermore, Strasbourg emphasises it is not a court of appeal. Implementing the
obligations deriving from Article 13 ECHR contributes to putting into practice
the principle of subsidiarity." If States would show an increasing willingness to
do so, the Strasbourg institutions can be expected to. be increasingly reticent in
their review. In such circumstances they can focus on guiding and assisting do-
mestic institutions in their supervision of the compliance with treaty obligations
by states.
4.2. Strasbourg as adequately equipped 'catcher'
If a case eventually does arrive in Strasbourg and a violation of the Convention
is found, maximum redress should be offered there. The applicant has invested
time and money to acquire a Strasbourg decision. Hence, it would not be correct
to make him return to a domestic procedure empty-handed if he is found to be in
the right. In some cases, however, Strasbourg is not adequately equipped with
powers or other means to provide for redress and is forced - under reservation of
a decision on Article 41 ECHR - to refer the case to the national level.
Such a referral seems appropriate to us only in two situations. The first
would be if restitutio in integrum can be awarded at the national level, for in-
stance by reopening a domestic procedure, or by changing an administrative de-
cision found to violate the Convention. This could lead to quashing a judicial
judgment in a concluded case, or reaching a new one in conformity with the
Convention, something for which Strasbourg lacks authority.26 Second, referral
would be appropriate when the Court is (factually) incapable of adequately de-
termining the extent of the harm, while there are strong indications the relevant
domestic institution might be capable of this.
Of course, after referral, the applicant having been found to be in the right,
should not have to wait for years after his 'Strasbourg victory' to be awarded
domestic redress, or a decision on the extent of the material damage.
In the Clooth case, for instance, the decision on Article 41 ECHR was de-
layed for no less than six years. In the 1991 judgment on the merits, the Court
24. See H.C. Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights
Jurisprudence (1996).
25. See, e.g., H. Petzold, The Convention and the Principle ofSubsidiarity, in R.StJ. Macdonald et al.
(Eds.), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights, 41-62 (1993); Garcia Ruiz v.
Spain, ECrtHR 21 January 1999, RJD 1999, para. 28.
26. See, e.g., Windisch v. Austria, ECrtHR 27 September 1990, (SeT. A), Vol. 186 and Windisch v. Aus-
tria (Article 50), ECrtHR 28 June 1993, (SeT. A), Vol. 255-0 (reopening of a national criminal pro-
cedure after the Court found a violation of Art. 6 ECHR, caused by the use of anonymous witnesses).
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found a violation of Article 5, paragraph 3 ECHR because of the duration of the
provisional detention." The Court reserved the matter of Article 41 ECHR in
view of the option to obtain compensation in Belgium on grounds of unlawful
deprivation of liberty. At the national level, the Court of Appeal in Brussels, on
7 November 1997, awarded the applicant, Mr Clooth, a compensation of
125.000 Belgian Francs for non-material harm. Mr Clooth, however, was of the
opinion that this domestic judgment only partly compensated him for the harm
caused by the violation ofArticle 5 ECHR and he filed additional claims. Ruling
on Article 41 ECHR, the Strasbourg Court stated on 5 March 1998, that the
judgment of the Court of Appeal in Brussels, offered sufficient redress for the
violation found on the merits, on the condition that this judgment was irrevoca-
ble.28
In our opinion, this case is an example that should not be followed: only after
more than six years a decision - and not even an irrevocable one - was reached,
leaving room for doubt as to whether the damage had been fully compensated.
This case can hardly be described as effective protection of human rights. After
referral for domestic redress the Court should set a time limit, for instance, one
year. If within this year domestic redress has not been offered, the Court itself
should deal with the claim concerning Article 41 ECHR.
In our view, the option of referral to a domestic institution offers no solace
for non-material damage suffered by the applicant. This type of damage might
just as well be dealt with by 'Strasbourg', according to the standards described
in paragraph 2 of this contribution. In this way the applicant is spared a need-
lessly extended procedure before a domestic court. This would conform to the
object and purpose of the Convention, which is to offer effective protection of
human rights."
4.3. Mutual aid
The Strasbourg and domestic institutions should also improve their mutual assis-
tance in providing protection of human rights.
'Strasbourg' could provide support to the domestic institutions - apart from
vigilant supervision of the availability of effective domestic remedies as re-
quired by Article 13 ECHR - in the following ways. In the first place, we would
like to draw renewed attention to an 'old', but still important suggestion. In our
opinion it would be ideal if the Strasbourg Court, after the model of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, would be given the authority to receive and answer pre-
liminary questions from domestic institutions during the course of a domestic
27. Clooth v. Belgium, ECrtHR 12 December 1991, (Ser. A), Vol. 225.
28. Clooth v. Belgium (Article 50), ECrtHR 5 March 1998, RJD 1998, para. 14-16.
29. See Barbera, Messegue and Jabardo v. Spain (Article 50), ECrtHR 13 June 1994 (Sec. A), Vol. 285-
C, para. 17.
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through a better organisation of the inclusion of Strasbourg decisions into the
decision-making by domestic institutions. This requires, among other things, the
creation of an adequate system of information on the Convention and the ver-
dicts of the Court for the benefit of the national courts, the legislature and the
administration, as well as the consistent testing in abstracto of draft legislation
against Convention rights. In this regard, in the future, the suggestions of the
Court and the reports of the Secretary General may possibly be used.
5. CONCLUSION
Where the protection of Convention rights is at issue, the (co-)operation of
Strasbourg and domestic institutions can still be vastly improved. Some of our
suggestions with respect to the improvement of such co-operation are easily
executed, others are not. But if the Strasbourg machinery is not to collapse, im-
proved prevention ofviolations and greater emphasis on effective domestic legal
protection is vital. To maintain the credibility of the ECHR supervisory system
it is also absolutely essential that improvements are made concerning compen-
sation in case of Convention violations. Again, the domestic institutions would
play an important part. If citizens are to have faith in it, 'Strasbourg' must be
able to offer them real results.
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procedure. In this way, significance and scope of Convention stipulations can be
established early on, so as to spare the applicant the long road to Strasbourg. The
execution of a Strasbourg judgment in a specific case could be further facilitated
if the European Court in its judgments would clearly indicate why a violation
has been found and which measures are required to implement the judgment
(these suggestions are discussed in paragraph 2 of this contribution). In case any
obscurities remain, according to the Rules of Procedure, the Court may be asked
to interpret its own judgment. As far as we are concerned, the Court should ap-
ply this power more liberally.30 Quite separate from disputes before the Court,
clear(er) Strasbourg judgments might assist domestic institutions in finding and
redressing violations at the national level. This might also help prevent the oc-
currence of Convention violations. Furthermore, in order to prevent Convention
violations, certain domestic institutions (including the legislature) should have a
realistic chance to ask the Court's advice on whether, for instance, draft legisla-
tion is (in abstracto) compatible with Convention rights. This is probably not
feasible in the short run. But at present the Secretary General of the Council of
Europe could at any rate start utilising his authority, based on Article 52 ECHR,
to request reports from Contracting States on the implementation of Convention
obligations in their domestic system. This too might have a considerable pre-
ventive effect.
The other way around, domestic institutions might also be able to help
'Strasbourg'. Naturally first and foremost by showing an active attitude con-
cerning (alleged) violations of the Convention. Domestic institutions should
utilise all their potential powers thoroughly to investigate a complaint about a
violation of human rights and, if necessary, offer redress. For us, this obviously
, includes the use of preliminary questions, as described above, as soon as this
option becomes available. If things still go wrong and Strasbourg finds a viola-
tion, the Strasbourg judgment should be correctly executed at the national level.
In our opinion, this necessitates creating the option of reopening domestic
cases." After reopening a case, a new decision may be reached, taking into ac-
count the Strasbourg verdict (including possible suggestions)." For those cases
in which this revision offers no solution, there should be an option to obtain re-
alistic compensation within a reasonable time. Apart from specific disputes, ex-
tended prevention of Convention violations might be attained, more in general,
30. In our opinion the Court takes a too restrictive stand in Allenet de Ribemont v. France, ECrtHR 7
August 1996, RJD 1996 and Hentrich v. France, ECrtHR 3 July 1997, RJD 1997.
31. Some Contracting States already offer this option. See for an inventory the study by the 'Committee
of Experts for the improvement of procedures for the protection of Human Rights under the authority
of the Steering Committee of Human Rights', Council of Europe, Strasbourg, January 1992, 13 Hu-
man Rights Law Journal 71-78 (1992).
32. See on this subject extensively T. Barkhuysen, M.L. van Emmerik & P.H.P.H.M.C. van Kempen
(Eds.), The Execution of Strasbourg and Geneva Human Rights Decisions in the National Legal Or-
der (1999).
